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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
There are two questions presented for review:
1.

Whether the applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah

Code Ann. (1953), may be raised for the first time on appeal.
2.

Whether a Utah general partnership, through its

managing partner who has both actual and constructive notice of a
pending quiet title action affecting seven acres of real property
subject to an executory real estate contract, can continue to
make payments on that property and acquire legal title to the
property, while the quiet title action is still pending, from an
interloper

whose

interest

in the seven acres is directly

challenged in the quiet title action and whose interest is
ultimately stipulated by the managing partner, through his
attorney, to be nothing and judgment is entered accordingly.
The panel of the Court of Appeals has tacitly decided
that the applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953),
may not be raised for the first time on appeal.

This tacit

decision is in conflict with Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline
Construction, 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988).
Furthermore, the panel of the Court of Appeals has
tacitly decided that one who continues to make payments on real
property

subject to an executory real estate contract and

acquires legal title to that property, while the quiet title
action is still pending, from an interloper whose interest in the
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property is directly challenged ; in the quiet title action and
whose interest is ultimately determined to be nothing, acquires
that legal title to the property regardless of the disposition of
that property made by the trial court.

This tacit decision is in

conflict with these decisions of the Utah Supreme Court:
Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1982);
Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, 590 P.2d
1244 (Utah 1979); and
Glynn v. Dubin, 369 P.2d 930 (Utah 1962).
This tacit decision is also in conflict with this decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals:
Blodgett v. Zions First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901
(Utah App. 1988).
This tacit decision seriously affects the integrity of
judicial proceedings In rem.

Property which is before the trial

court for disposition can be validly alienated away by one before
the court whose interest is ultimately determined to be nothing
to another who has both actual and constructive notice of those
in rem proceedings while those proceedings are still pending.
CITATION TO OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals
can be found at 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 1990).

i
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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
The decision of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals
was entered in this case on October 19, 1990.
requested.

No rehearing was

No order granting an extension of time within which

to petition for certiorari has been entered.
Section 78-2-2(b), Utah Code Ann. (1989), is believed
to confer jurisdiction upon the Utah Supreme Court to review the
decision in question by a writ of certiorari.
CONTROLLING STATUTE
Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides:
In any action affecting the title to, or
the right of possession of, real property the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time
of filing his answer when affirmative relief
is claimed in such answer, or at any time
afterward, may file for record with the
recorder of the county in which the property
or some part thereof is situated a notice of
the pendency of the action, containing the
names of the parties, the object of the
action or defense, and a description of the
property in that county affected thereby.
From the time of filing such notice for
record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer
of the property affected thereby be deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of
the action, and only of its pendency against
parties designated by their real names.
(Emphasis added.)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an action to quiet title to seven acres of real

property located in Summit County, Utah.
B.

Course of Proceedings
On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major ("Weber")1 filed

1.

a complaint to quiet title to eleven parcels of real estate
located in Summit County.
Utah

general

Snyderville West ("Snyderville"), a

partnership,

and

Jim

Gaddis

( "Gaddis" ) ,

Snyderville' s managing partner, were two of seventy named
defendants.

(R. 0001-0021; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40)
2.

On April 11, 1983, Weber recorded a Lis Pendens

describing the eleven parcels of real property.

By Order entered

March 19, 1990, Judge Regnal W. Garff of the Utah Court of
Appeals granted Plaintiff/Appellant fs Motion to Supplement the
Record

to include the lis pendens.

The seven acres were

described as Parcel 6 In the Lis Pendens.

(R. 0664-0682: 1 4;

Appendix WA" hereto)

1. Steven W. Major died and Brenda Major Weber was named as
successor Personal Representative in 1984.
(R. 0378-0383; 146
Utah Adv. Rep. at 43, ft. 1)

I
4
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3.

By order dated December 17, 1983, the trial court

allowed service by publication upon Snyderville and sixteen other
named defendants.

Counsel for Weber could not determine the

identity of any agent to serve on Snydervillefs behalf.

(R.

0264-0282; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 and 43, ft. 6)
4.

The trial court entered a default judgment against

Snyderville on August 29, 1985.

(R. 0432-0435, 0444-0454; 146

Utah Adv. Rep. at 41)
5.

On October 2, 1985, following lengthy negotiations

among twenty-six of the developer defendants, Gaddis, through his
attorney, entered into a complex Stipulation for Settlement
providing that the seven acres vest in Weber.
6.

On January 17, 1986, Judgment was entered quieting

title to the seven acres in Weber.
Exhiblt "C" thereto; R. 0837-0966:
C.

(R. 0479-0525)

(R. 0552-0572:

11 2 and 3-

11 8, 11 and 12)

Disposition in The Lower Courts
1.

In the fall of 1988, Snyderville sought to have

the default judgment against it set aside.
0977; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41)

(R. 0573-0633, 0637-

The district court determined

that there was "no adequate explanation . . . [for the] failure
to personally serve Snyderville West at its known tax address"
and set aside the judgment.

(R. 0979-0989; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at

41)
5
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2.

In 1989, Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss

premised on Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6),
which was granted.
3.

(R. 0996-1022; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41)

This appeal followed,

(R. 1023-1029; 146 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 41)
4.

A panel of the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the

trial court, holding that:

1) service of process upon Jim Gaddis

in his individual capacity did not effect service of process
upon, nor confer jurisdiction over, Snyderville; 2) service by
publication was inappropriate where no personal inquiry was made
at Snydervillefs last known address within the state; 3) since
service by publication on Snyderville was not warranted, such
service

was

not

sufficient

to confer

jurisdiction

over

Snyderville and the default judgment against it was void; and 4)
Weber raised no argument demonstrating error in dismissal on Rule
12(b)(5) grounds.
5.

(146 Utah Adv. Rep. 40-43)

The panel found no merit in Weber's lis pendens

argument, raised for the first time in her reply brief.

(146

Utah Adv. Rep. at 43, ft. 3)
D.

Statement of Relevant Facts
1.

percent

From 1978 to the present, Gaddis has held a ten

interest

in Snyderville and has been its managing
i
6
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(R. 0664-0682: %% 1 and 2; R. 1031: 11-14; R. 0582-

partner,

0633, Exhibit "A" thereto (R. 0598); 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40)
2.

For $120,000, in 1978, Snyderville purchased from

Investor Associates seven acres, a portion of the property at
issue in the quiet title action.

Robert W. Major ("Major")

executed the pertinent real estate contract on behalf of Investor
Associates.

Major died

on March

20, 1980.

Immediately

thereafter, Joseph L. Krofchek ("Krofchelc"), an interloper,
purportedly transferred to himself all right, title and interest
in property belonging to Investor Associates, including the seven
acres.

Snyderville took possession of the seven acres in 1978

and made timely payments until Major f s death; thereafter,
payments continued, albeit to different payees, with the final
payment of $32,210.10 being made on July 10, 1983.

In October

1983, Snyderville recorded a warranty deed for the seven acres
given to it by Joseph L. Krof chek.

In the quiet title action

Krofchek's interest was directly challenged and was ultimately
stipulated by Gaddis, through his attorney to be nothing.
0001-0021:

%% 1, 8-10, 14-17 Exhibit "B" thereto; R. 1031:

(R.
23-

30, Exhibits 3, 6, 7 and 8 thereto; R. 0479-0525, 0552-0572,
0526-0551; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40)
3.

Weber paid the real property taxes on the seven

acres for the years 1986 and 1987.

(R. 0664-0682:

7
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% 12;

R. 0653-0658:

1 3)

When it paid the real property taxes in

1987, Snyderville learned that the trial court had divested it of
title by means of the default judgment against it.

(R. 0600; 146

Utah Adv. Rep. at 40)
4.

Prom the time it took possession of the subject

property in 1978, Snyderville's address had been correctly listed
as Gaddis's office address on the Summit County tax records.

(R.

0274, 0279, 0600, 0992, 0995; R. 1030: 38-39; R. 1031: 13-14; 146
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40-41)
5.

No filing in the appropriate county or state

offices revealed the name of any individual affiliated with
Snyderville nor did Snyderville have a telephone directory
listing.

Although Gaddis was served in his individual capacity

at his office on May 11, 1983, the summons served upon him was
directed to him individually and made no reference to Snyderville
except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy defendants.
The return of service indicated that Gaddis had been served
personally and did not purport that service on Snyderville had
been effected through him.

By order dated December 17, 1983, the

trial court allowed service by publication upon Snyderville and
4

sixteen other named defendants.

(R. 1031: 13-15, 22, 32-33,

Exhibit 11 thereto; R. 0664-0682: % 3; R. 0731-0825, Exhibit "A"
thereto; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41)
i
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6.

As a corollary to service by publication, counsel

for Weber prepared a summons for mailing to Snyderville at its
tax address, i.e., Gaddis's office at 1253 East 2100 South in
Salt Lake City.
7.

(R. 1030: 50-54; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41)

The affidavit of mailing listed

Snydervillefs

address as "1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly stating the south
coordinate by fifty blocks.

Although there is no such address,

and, according to a Postal Service supervisor's affidavit, the
summons directed to Snyderville should have been returned by the
Postal Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that the summons
had been returned, although other summonses were returned.

The

Postal Service does not keep records of returned first class mail
and it is therefore unknown if the mailed summons ever reached
Snyderville.

Gaddis had no recollection of receiving a summons

through the mail.

(R. 0300-0330, 1 4(e); R. 1030: 13, 54-55; R.

0714-0715; R. 0600; R. 1031: 44-45; R. 0736-0737; 146 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 41)
8.

The trial court entered a default judgment against

Snyderville on August 29, 1985.
Stipulation

Pursuant to negotiations and the

for Settlement entered by Gaddis, through his

attorney, on January 26, 1986, Judgment was entered quieting
title to the seven acres in Weber.

In the fall of 1988,

Snyderville sought to have the judgment set aside.
9
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The district

court determined that there was "no adequate explanation . . .
[for the] failure to personally serve Snyderville West at its
known

tax address" and set aside the judgment-

In 1989,

Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss premised on Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which was granted.

This appeal followed.

(See If B.4, B.5, B.6, C.l# C.2 and C.3 hereinabove - Course of
Proceedings and Disposition In The Lower Courts)
9.

On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Weber

claimed that Snyderville was effectively served through personal
service upon Jim Gaddis or, alternatively, that it was properly
served by publication.

Weber challenged the trial court's order

of dismissal in favor of Snyderville as improper under Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a).

In her reply brief, Weber also claimed that

Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), was determinative of the
action.

(See %% C.4 and C.5 hereinabove - Disposition in The

Lower Courts)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPLICABILITY OF A STATUTE MAY
BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.
4

In Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction,
754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988), Judge Orme addressed whether a
statute's inapplicability could be raised for the first time on
i
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appeal.

Together with Judge Bench and Judge Howard, Judge Orme

wrote:
. . . Appellants have raised for the
first time on appeal the inapplicability of
the procurement code. Ordinarily, arguments,
positions, and issues may not be raised for
the first time on appeal.
See, e.g.,
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah
1983); Conder v. A. L. Williams & Assocs.,
Inc. , 739 P.2d 634, 637 n.2 (Utah Ct. App.
1987. That doctrine is not, however, applied
in a vacuum.
Where some countervailing
principle is to be served, the doctrine must
occasionally yield. See, e.g., UWC Assoc, v.
Home Sav. & Loan, 7 8 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 8
(1988).
754 P.2d at 674
In Cox, appellants raised for the first time on appeal
the inapplicability of the Utah Procurement Code, Section 63-56-1
to -73, and its payment bond requirements, Section 14-1-13, Utah
Code Ann.

Judge Orme compared the circumstances in Cox to the

case of Robbins v. Sonoma County Flood Control & Water Cons.
District, 138 Cal. 291, 292 P.2d 52, 56 (Cal. App. 1956):
. . . [A] pleading must be tested, not
by what it says as to the effect of [public
laws and public acts], but by the contents of
the laws and acts themselves."
754 P.2d at 675.
See also Maynard Investment Co. v. McCann, 465 P.2d 657, 660-661
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(Wash, 1970); and Huntress v. Huntress1 Estate, 235 F.2d 205, 209
(7th Cir. 1956).
In Cox, Judge Orme examined

the contents of the

statutes themselves, held that they were not applicable and
reversed the decision of the trial court.

The case was remanded

for a determination of whether additional evidence should be
received.
In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987)
Judge Garff articulated principles for determining when and under
what circumstances a new issue might be considered:
• • . In Utah, matters not raised in the
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial may
not be raised for the first time on appeal,
Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754,
758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire
Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). A
matter is sufficiently raised if it has been
submitted to the trial court and the trial
court has had the opportunity to make
findings of fact or law.
See Turtle
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc.,
645 P. 2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982). "Theories or
issues which are not apparent or reasonably
discernible from the pleadings, affidavits
and exhibits will not be considered."
Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Pauli, 565 P.2d 835,
838 (Wyo. 1977).
In particular, even if
pleadings are generously interpreted, if they
are not supported by any factual showing or
by the submission of legal authority, they
are not presented for decision.
Intf 1
Business Mach. Corp. v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho
194, 677 P.2d 507, 510 (1964). Further, the
rule that a legal theory may not be raised
for the first time on appeal is "to be
12
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stringently applied when the new theory
depends on controverted factual questions
whose relevance thereto was not made to
appear at trial."
Boqacki v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 489 P.2d 537,
543-44, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657, 663-64 (1971),
cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1301,
31 L.Ed.2d 488 (1972); see also Campbell v.
Graham-Armstrong, 9 Cal.3d 482, 509 P.2d 689,
107 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1973); Church v. Roemer,
94 Idaho 782, 498 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1972).
In order for a theory to be considered on appeal, then,
certain requirements must be met:
1.

The matter must have been either raised in the

pleadings or put in issue at trial.
2.

If a matter is put at issue and submitted to the

trial court, the trial court must have had an opportunity to make
findings of fact or law.
3.

The theory or issue must be apparent or reasonably

discernible from the pleadings.
4.

A matter raised in a pleading must be supported

either by a factual showing or the submission of legal authority.
5.

The theory or issue must not depend on facts that

could have been controverted before the trial court.
Here
In this case, the matter of the Lis Pendens having been
recorded on April 11, 1983 was raised in Paragraph 4 of Weber ! s
June 3, 1988 Statement of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant
Judgment.

Snyderville

West's Motion to Set Aside Default

(R. 0664-0682, 1 4 )
The fact that the Lis Pendens had been recorded was a

basic given before the trial court.

Whether it had been recorded

was never at issue.
The doctrine of lis pendens is readily discernible from
the undisputed fact that the Lis Pendens was recorded.

The Lis

Pendens was recorded pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-402.

The contents of that statute expressly set forth the doctrine

'

of lis pendens.
In its June

24, 1988 trial

court Memorandum

in

Response, Snyderville did not dispute the fact that the Lis
Pendens had been recorded.

(R. 0731-0825)

In fact, on March 20,

1990 Snyderville acknowledged before the Court of Appeals that
the April 11, 1983 Lis Pendens was "a document incontrovertibly
of record in the Summit County Recorder's Office."

(Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant/Respondent
Snyderville West's Motion to Disregard or Strike Reply Brief of
Plaintiff/Appellant, p. 4 —

Appendix "Cw hereto)

Snyderville!s

failure to dispute Weber's assertion that the Lis Pendens had
been recorded amounted to a factual showing by Weber of the truth
of that assertion.

Utah law does not require that the recorded

Lis Pendens be filed in the action of which it gives notice.
14
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i

Snyderville could not hdve controverted the fact of the
Lis

Pendens

having

been

recorded.

The

document

was

uncontrovertibly of record in the Summit County Recorder's
Office.
Weber's Reply Brief presented a purely legal issue to
the Court of Appeals:
governed the action.

Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953),
Where a purely legal issue is raised in a

case for the first time before an appellate court, that case
should be governed by the applicable law.

See, e.g. , Vintero

Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, 675 F.2d 513, 515 (2d
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (five cases from various circuits cited
as authority

for appellate consideration of new issues if

additional facts not required, or pure legal issue involved;
unjust

enrichment

issue considered when only argument for

imposition of constructive trust raised below); Ricard v. Birch,
529 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1975) (application of tolling statute
could be raised for first time on appeal as exception to rule of
nonreviewability) ; Burns v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 265
Cal. App. 2d 98, 105-06, 71 Cal. Rptr. 326, 330 (1968) (court
cited three prior decisions as precedent for permitting new
issues of law to be raised first on appeal); Cronin v. Lindberg,
66 111. 2d 47, 61, 360 N.E.2d 360, 366 (1976) (citing two prior
decisions that allowed exceptions based on public importance of
15
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legal issues to be raised on appeal); People ex rel. Sterba v.
Blaser, 33 111. App. 3d 1, 10-11, 337 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1975)
(court referred to one prior holding to support new legal issue
being raised when all pertinent facts were before the court);
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1969) (in
interest of judicial economy, applicability of Voting Rights Act
provision not precluded from consideration by failure to raise
issue below where all facts undisputed); Telco Leasing, Inc. v.
Transwestern Title Co., 630 F.2d 691, 693-94 (9th Cir. 1980)
(where issue purely one of law and not affected by factual record
below appellate court has discretion to consider for first time
application of correct state statute concerning attorney's fees);
Zinn v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 148 Cal. App. 2d 56, 82-83, 306 P.2d
1017, 1034 (1957) (court permitted application of conflict of
laws doctrine for first time on appeal); Higqinbotham v. Ford
Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976).
raises a purely

legal question.

"[T]he new theory

No facts could have been

developed to aid our resolution of the issue. . . .

Under these

circumstances, we believe it would be unjust now to refuse to
consider the new argument."
of California stated:

Id. at 768 n.10.

The Supreme Court

lf

[W]hen as here the facts with reference

to the contention newly made on appeal appear to be undisputed
and that probably no different showing could be made on a new
i
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trial it is deemed appropriate to entertain the contention as a
question

of

law on the undisputed

accordingly."

facts and pass on it

Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal. 2d 337, 341, 302

P.2d 738, 740 (1956); Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. , 24 Cal. App. 3d 35, 43, 100 Cal. Rptr. 791, 797
(1972) (court permitted new argument based on provision of
California Labor Act when all pertinent facts were before the
court), afffd, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
This is such a case.

The integrity of the judicial

process in an iri rem proceeding should not be subverted by
allowing an interloper who is a party to that proceeding to put
property beyond the trial court's jurisdiction by means of a
spurious deed to a general partnership whose managing partner has
both actual and constructive notice that the property is before
the court for disposition.
This Court should issue a Writ of Certiorari to the
Utah Court

of Appeals

to review and reverse that court's

erroneous decision not to consider Weber's lis pendens argument.
POINT II.
BY VIRTUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF L I S
PENDENS SET FORTH IN SECTION 7 8 - 4 0 2,
UTAH
CODE
ANN.
(1953),
S N Y D E R V I L L E WAS BOUND BY THE
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT AND THE
JANUARY 1 7 , 1 9 8 6 JUDGMENT VESTING
TITLE TO THE SEVEN ACRES IN WEBER.

17
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The argument supporting this point is set forth in
Point I of the Reply Brief of Appellant, which is included as
Appendix "D" to this Petition.
CONCLUSION
The

applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann.

(1953) and the doctrine of lis pendens contained therein is a
purely legal issue which should have been considered by the panel
of the Court of Appeals.

Snyderville could not have disputed the

fact of the Lis Pendens having been recorded on April 11, 1983.
The Court of Appeals ordered that Weber's Motion to Supplement
the Record to include the Lis Pendens be granted.
This Court should grant Weber's Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to preserve the integrity of the judicial process in
quiet title proceedings.
DATED:

November 19, 1990.
Respectfully submitted
A.
R0BERT7J. 0RT0N
VIRGINIA C. LEE
MARSDEN, 0RT0N, CAH00N & G0TTFREDS0N
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Hand delivered

four

(4) copies of this Petition of

Plaintiff/Appellant for Writ of Certiorari to:
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.
AJU
this

Richard A. Rappapout, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Appellee
Fifth Floor
525 East First South
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

day of November, 1990.

Pursuant to Rules 45 through 49

of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, each of those four (4)
copies indicated on its cover the date of filing of the Petition
and the Certiorari Docketing Number of the Utah Supreme Court.
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APPENDIX
Order and Motion to Supplement Record
Opinion of the Panel of the Utah Court of Appeals; 146 Utah
Adv. Rep. 40.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Defendant/Respondent Snyderville West's Motion to Disregard
or Strike Reply Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant
Reply Brief of Appellant (Addendum "P" omitted)
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Brenda Major Webb,
Personal Representative of
the Estate of Robert W. Major,
Sr,. Deceased,

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 890599-CA
English Inn Co., Inc., a
Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendants,
and
Snyderville West,
Defendant and Respondent.

This matter is before the court on appellant's motion to
supplement the record and respondent's motion to strike
portions of appellant's reply brief. Respondent has filed an
objection to the motion to supplement the record,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion to supplement the
record is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the motion to strike portions
of appellant's reply brief is deferred until plenary
presentatiorL-and consideration of the case.
day of March, 1990.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of March, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail.
Robert F. Orton
Virgina Curtis Lee
Marsden, orton & Cahoon
Attorneys at Law
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Richard A. Rappaport
William B. Wray, Jr.,
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
525 East First South
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
DATED this 16th day of March, 1990.
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1
2

ROBERT F. ORTON - #A2 4 33
VIRGINIA C. LEE - #1923
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET, FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 34 101
TELEPHONE :

( 801 ) f>2 I - .ifiOu

3

COURT OF APPEALS

4

STATE OF UTAH

5
6
7

BRENDA MAJOR WEBEk,
Personal Representative of
the Estate of ROF5ERT ¥i.
MAJOR, SR., Deceased,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

8
9
10

vs.

12

District Court
No. 7325

ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a
Utah corporation, et a.l . ,

11

Case No. 890599-CA

Priority:

14(b)

Defendants,
and

MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD

13
SNYDERVILLE WEST,
14
Defendant/Respondent.
15
16

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of the Utah Court of

17

Appeals,

18

Representative of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., Deceased,

19

by and through counsel , hereby moves this Court for an Order

20

Supplementing the Record on Appeal to include the Lis Pendens

21

recorded with respect

22

Motion is brought for the following reasons:

P.I a .i nt i f f ' Appe.l 1 ant

Brenda Major Weber, Persona

t>» this action on April

23
24
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11, 1983.

This

1.
Opposition
1

II Default

In

ht--r Statement

Points

and Authorities

to Defendant: Snyderville West's Motion

Judgment, the Personal

2

Statement

3

Pendens

was

4

County,

State of Utah with

5

0682, <l! 4)

of Facts

6

In

3.

In

forth

in the

11th day of April, 1983, a Lis

respect

its Memorandum

her

set

in

to Set Aside

in the office of the Recorder

did not dispute this fact.

8

Representative

that on the

recorded

2.

7

of

of

to said action.

Summit

(R. 0664-

in Response, Snydervil]e West

(R. 0731-0825)

Brief

of

Appellant,

the

Personal

9

I Representative again sterlet the fact that on April 11, 1983, the

10

Personal Representative caused a Lis Pendens regarding the quiet

H

I title

12

II Office.

13

II

14

action

to 'be recorded

in

the

Summit

County Recorder 1 s

(Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 18)
4,

in its Brief of Respondent, Snyderville West does

not dispute this fact.

15

5.

Section

7H--40-2, Utah Code Ann.

(1953) provides

16

for

17

county in which the property is situated, but does not require a

18

copy of the lis pendens to be filed with the court in which the

19

action is pending.

20

filing

a

6.

lis

The

pendens

for record with

Iijs Pendens

recorded

the recorder

with respect

21
22
23
24
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of

the

to this

action was styled as a pleading in the action and a copy is
attached as Exhibit "A" hereto.
1

II

7.

Appellant believes that the Lis Pendens would be

2

helpful to this Court in definitively establishing the undisputed

3

fact it was recorded and that it concerned the subject seven

4

acres.

5

8.

In her Keply Brief of Appellant, the Personal

6

Representative

argues

that

the recorded

7

Snyderville West conr. t runt i vt.» notice of the pendency of this

8

action affecting its equitable title to the seven acres, and that

9

together with the actual notice Snyderville West had through its

10

managing partner, James R. Gaddis, Snyderville West is bound by

11

the results set forth in the January 17, 1986 Judgment.

12

DATED:

\f:

kciuML

v L ^ ^

14

ROBER-fT

15 I

20
21
22
23
24

ORToY

VIKGINI^C. LEE
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON

16 "
17 I

19

gave

February 2G, 1990.

13

18

Lis Pendens

CERTIFICATE OF ..SERVICE
Mailed

a true and correct

copy of this Motion to

Supplement Record to:
Richard A. Rappaport
William B. Wray, Jr.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
Fifth Floor
3
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5 25 E a s t IVirsi: South
P . O . Box 1 1 ooi;
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

1

postage

p r e p a i d this f/

I

(la

V <>f February, 1990

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
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20
21
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ro'^r
m pr.d for Summit County. St.Me of Utah,
..•:-.'. .,:•.•;! for^jc-ii'.g is a full, true and correct copy

do r.';io;.'/ <
of ihat c-;r::

*\
which :vbeing Er

^'V

A *\

IN • ;*!T;
cfficiai t..

Page - V o l e

mv hand and affixed my
' j \

AWA

,c

- o ^ y Recorder

, 1

ROBERT F. ORTON
T. RICHARD DAVIS

2

M A R S D E N . O R T O N & LILJENOUIST

3

ATTORNEYS FOR

4

68 S O U T H MAIN. FIFTH F L O O R

5

SALT L A K E CITY. UTAH

6

T E L E P H O N E : (801)

PLAINTIFF

84101

521-3800

Entry No
204486
Book MAS
7
p,g9 ,3
REQUEST OF J?JJJ^^X)^^
«FEE

S-42

W SPFCQCS. S'J-vtflT CCMgCORQSa

oo

RECORDED

31-41
.

"WR1

<.2D

7
8
9

10
11

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

M

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN W. MAJOR, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., Deceased,

12
13

i

Plaintiff,

LIS PENDENS

vs.
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utah
Corporation; PARK CITY UTAH
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation,
CHARLES E. HIRSCH; HAROLD D.
HIRSCH; SAM A. HEPNER, EUGENE H.
POWERT; MASASHI HASHIDA; J. E.
ROBERTS a/k/a JACK E. ROBERTS,
FROSTWOOD LIMITED, a Utah
Limited Partnership; J. L.
KROFCHECK a/k/a JOSEPH L.
KROFCHECK; ROBERT L. BARRETT;
SNYDERVILLE WEST; PARTNERSHIP
INVESTMENT OF COLORADO, INC., a
Corporation; PARK WEST WATER
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit
Corporation; HALBET ENGINEERING,
INC., a California Corporation;
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
Corporation; MAJOR-BLAKENEY
CORPORATION, a California

Civil No.

7336

B00KM2 57PAGE236
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Corporation; ASPEN GROVE, INC., a
Utah Corporation; LESTER F.
HEWLETT, JR.; RUTH BRAZIER HEWLETT;
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO., a.Utah
Limited Partnership; H. E. BABCOCK
and J. E. ROBERTS d/b/a PARKWEST
LAND COMPANY, INVESTOR ASSOCIATES,
SYNDICATE, a Delaware Unincorporated Association; WILLIAM S.
RICHARDS; MURRAY FIRST THRIFT AND
LOAN COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
J, ROBERT WEST; LIFE RESOURCES,
INC., an Oregon Corporation; KARL
C. LESUEUR; H. J. SAPERSTEIN,
TRUSTEE; PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah
Corporation; WAYLAND P. CALKINS;
BARBARA CALKINS; McGHIE LAND TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Trustee, AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES
OF UTAH, INC., a Utah Corporation;
JOHN CANEPARI; KERRY D. BODILY;
SKI PARK CITY WEST, INC., a Utah
Corporation; NATIONAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation; ENSIGN COMPANY, a California
Limited Partnership; ROBERT W.
ENSIGN? CITY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a Corporation;
WESTERN STATES TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; J. TAYLOR LOTT
a/k/a JOHN TAYLOR LOTT; UTAH TITLE
& ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation; PARK WEST ASSOCIATES,
a Utah General Partnership; JAMES
WEBSTER ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah
Corporation; JAY BAKER d/b/a JAY
BAKER ELECTRIC; RYDER STILLWELL;
DIANA L. LESUEUR; A. J, SLAGEL
a/k/a ZELLA J. SLAGEL; RAY WINN;
JOHN MULLER; GERALD W. WALTERS;
NEW YORK INVESTORS, INC., a New
York Corporation; MICHAEL SPURLOCK;
DORIE SPURLOCK; MARIA KROFCHECK;
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 24, Inclusive;
and all other persons unknown
claiming any right, title, or

B00KM2 57PAGEZ3 7
-
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

interest in or lien against the real
'property described in Plaintiff's
Complaint adverse to Plaintiff's
ownership or clouding his title
thereto; PARK CITY WEST ASSOCIATION,
a Utah Corporation; CITY DEVELOPMENT
CO., INC., a Utah Corporation;
STANDARD INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a
California Corporation; GREAT
NORTHERN LAND CORPORATION, a
California Corporation; INN
INVESTORS, a Partnership; TITLE
INSURANCE AGENCY, a Utah Corporation;
REESE HOWELL; AMERICAN SAVINGS &
LOAN, a Utah Corporation; JOE COX;
JIM GADDIS; SAM WILSON; HENRY
WINKLER; and JOHN DOES 2 5 through
50, Inclusive,
Defendants.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Notice is hereby given that an action has been commenced
in the above-entitled Court, by the above-named Plaintiff against
the above-named Defendants, which suit is now pending; that one of
the objects of said suit is to quiet title in the Estate of Robert
W. Major, Jr., Deceased, to real property situated in Summit
County, State of Utah, specifically described in Exhibit "A" which
is attached hereto.
DATED THIS £'*L

day of April, 1983.

22

jQ

23
24

ROBERT F. ORTON
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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1
2

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

3
4
5

On t h i s

day o f A p r i l ,

1983, p e r s o n a l l y

b e f o r e me ROBERT F. ORTON, s i g n e r o f t h e f o r e g o i n g

appeared

Instrument,

who d u l y acknowledged t o me t h a t he e x e c u t e d t h e same.

6
7
8

'4

•'•£.$•/.'''''•/
' *-•.';S/
'l/4m:\.\

\
.

\

NOTARY PUBLIC 1/0
> Z
R e s i d i n g aa tt:: sddUtf /\<LA^
Residing

"1

^ ° ; C | rAfi$'COMMISSION EXPIRES:

13-...I

OF

•14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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EXHIBIT "A"

Parcel No, 1:
Lot A, Lots 18 thru 19, 22 thru 24, 28 thru 38, PAPJC CITY VEST SUBDIVISION
NO. 1, according to the official plat thereof on file and of record in the
office of the Sumait County Recorder, State of Utah.
Parcel No. 2:
Lots 1 thru A,, 17 thru 25, PARK CITY UEST SUBDIVISION NO. 2, according to the
official plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the Summit County
Recorder, State of Utah. Also, THE KAIL, PAPJC CITY WEST SUBDIVISION NO. 2.
Parcel No. 3;
In Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian:
Beginning at a point which is the NW corner of property conveyed to Spencer
Osborne et ux., in a Special Warranty Deed recorded March 31, 1969, as Entry
No. 108801, in Book M-2Q, page 389, O.R., said point being on the North line of
said Section 1; thence Uest along said section line 432 feet; thence South 1°
50* East 715 feet; thence East 410 feet, more or less, to a point which is
directly South of the aforesaid beginning point; thence North in a straight
line to the said point of beginning 713 feet, more or less. TOGETHER,WITH
an Easement for ingress, egress and underground utilities as set forth in the
.first paragraph on page 5 of that certain Judgment on Stipulation recorded as
Entry No. 113601, Book M-32, pages 269-276, on July 26, 1971.
Parcel No. 4;
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian:
The North 165 feet of the SW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 36;
and the South 1/2 of the NW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 36;
and the West 100 feet of the N 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4
of Section 36; and the North 330 feet of the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW
1/4 of Section 36. TOGETHER WITH an Easement for ingress, egress and underground utilities as set forth in the second paragraph on page 5 of that certain Judgment on Stipulation recorded as Entry No. 113601, Book M-32, pages
269-276, on July 26, 1971.
Parcel No. 5;
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian:
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence
North along the East line of said Plat No. 2 for 204 feet; thence East 160
feet; thence South 204.00 feet; thence in a straight line West to the point of
beginning. TOGETHER WITH an Easement 27.6 feet wide for ingress, egress and
underground utilities, over a land strip lying 13.8 feet each side of a ccnuerline commencing at a point which is 173.8 feet East of the Southeast corner of
Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence 680.6 feet North, more or Jess, to
a right of way south line, which right of way is known as "Major Drive" within
said Park City West Plat No. 2, connecting with Park City West Tlat No. 1, said
plats being recorded subdivision in the Submit County records.
Parcel No. 6:
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East,
part of the Northwest quarter Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, and
part of Northeast quarter of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East oC the •
Salt Lake Base and Meridian described as follows: Beginning at the Southwest ^
corner of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meri- N .
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ORME, Judge:
This is an appeal by plaintiff Brenda Major Weber1
challenging interlocutory and final orders setting aside a
default judgment in favor of plaintiff and dismissing defendant
Snvderville

West

("SnvHervil 1P*M

acs a

narhr

*-n

an

arfi^n

t-n

quiet title to real property. This appeal primarily focuses on
the sufficiency of service of process on Snyderville.
FACTS
On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major filed a complaint to
quiet title to eleven parcels of real estate located in Summit
1. This action was originally brought by Steven W. Major,
personal representative of the estate of Robert W. Major, Jr
During the course of the litigation Steven W. Major died and
the present plaintiff was named as successor personal
representative.
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County. Snyderville, a Utah general partnership, and Jim
Gaddis were two of seventy named defendants.2 Jim Gaddis
holds a ten-percent interest in Snyderville and is its managing
partner.
In 1978, Snyderville purchased from Investor Associates a
portion of the property at issue in the quiet title action.
Robert W. Major executed the pertinent real estate contract on
behalf of Investor Associates. Snyderville took possession of
the property and made timely payments, with the final payment
being made on July 20, 1983. In October 1983, Snyderville
recorded a warranty deed for the property given to it by
Investor Associates. Snyderville paid property taxes on the
parcel through October 1987, when it learned that the trial
court had divested it of title by means of a default judgment
against it«
From the time it took possession of the subject property
in 1978, Snyderville's address had been correctly listed as
Gaddis1s office address on the Summit County tax records.
No filing in the appropriate county or state offices
revealed the name of any individual affiliated with Snyderville
nor did Snyderville have a telephone directory listing.
Although Gaddis was served in his individual capacity at his
office on May 11, 1983, the summons served upon him was
directed to him individually and made no reference to
Snyderville except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy
defendants. The return of service indicated that Gaddis had
been served personally and did not purport that service on
Snyderville had been effected through him. By order dated
December 17, 1983, the trial court allowed service by
publication upon Snyderville and sixteen other named defendants.
As a corollary to service by publication, counsel for
Weber prepared a summons for mailing to Snyderville at its tax
address, i.e., Gaddis's office at 1253 East 2100 South in Salt
Lake City.
2. As may be expected in litigation involving numerous parties
and several transactions, the facts before the court are
numerous and complicated. We commend counsel for both parties
for their succinct presentation of the relevant facts. We
further note that both parties1 careful compliance with Utah R.
App. P. 24 has assisted the court in efficiently deciding the
matters before it. Of particular assistance to the court was
the comprehensive addenda of key documents annexed to the
briefs.
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The affidavit of mailing listed Snyderville•s address as
"1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly stating the south
coordinate by fifty blocks. Although there is no such address,
and, according to a Postal Service supervisor's affidavit, the
summons directed to Snyderville should have been returned by
the Postal Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that the
summons had been returned, although other summonses were
returned for insufficient postage. The Postal Service does not
keep records of returned first class mail and it is therefore
unknown if the mailed summons ever reached Snyderville. Gaddis
had no recollection of receiving a summons through the mail.
The trial court entered a default -judgment against
Snyderville on August 29, 1985. In the fall of 1988,
Snyderville sought to have the judgment set aside. The
district court determined that there was "no adequate
explanation . . . [for the] failure to personally serve
Snyderville West at its known tax address" and set aside the
judgment. In 1989, Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss
premised on Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which was
granted. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Weber claims that Snyderville was effectively
served through personal service upon Jim Gaddis or,
alternatively, that it was properly served by publication.
Weber also challenges the court's order of dismissal in favor
of Snyderville as improper under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 3
PERSONAL SERVICE
Weber asserts that Gaddis*s position as managing partner
of Snyderville qualified him to receive service of process for
Snyderville. Weber further claims that service upon Gaddis
automatically perfected service upon Snyderville by virtue of
his position as managing partner and his status as a partner.
We agree that Gaddis was authorized to receive process for
Snyderville. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5) (service upon a
3. Weber also claims that, notwithstanding any deficiencies in
service of process, Snyderville is bound by a stipulation for
settlement and the judgment entered thereon on January 17,
1986, by reason of the fact Gaddis, through his own counsel,
was a party to the stipulation. We find no merit in this
argument nor in Weber's lis pendens argument, raised for the
first time in her reply brief.
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partnership shall be effective through service upon managing or
general agent). However, personal service upon Gaddis did not
confer jurisdiction over Snydervillec Weber incorrectly
focuses on Gaddis*s capacity, rather than the import of the
summons served upon him. Any number of agents or partners of
Snyderville might be authorized to receive service for the
partnership, yet if no service is ever attempted on the
partnership no service on it can be perfected.4
Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states,
with our emphasis: "The summons shall contain the . . . names
. . . of the parties to the action . . . [and] be directed to
the defendant." Gaddis's summons was directed to him, not to
Snyderville. While this might have provided Snyderville with
constructive or even actual knowledge of the action, the
insufficiency of process is not thereby cured. See Stone v.
Hicks, 45 N.C. App. 66, 262 S.E.2d 318, 319 (1980) (where one
defendant received a summons directed to another defendant,
service was ineffective on the receiving defendant even though
the caption listed him as a defendant). See generally 62B Am.
Jur. 2d Process section 81 (1990). We hold that service of
process upon Jim Gaddis in his individual capacity did not
effect service of process upon, nor confer jurisdiction over,
Snyderville.
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
Rule 4(f)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in
effect at all times pertinent to this case,5 authorized
service by publication when personal service is impractical
because the
person upon whom service is sought resides
outside of the state, or has departed from
the state, or cannot after due diligence
be found within the state . . . .

4. Weber's claim that service on Gaddis was adequate to serve
the partnership is belied by Weber's own course of conduct. If
she believed Snyderville had been properly served through
Gaddis there would have been no need to include it in the
motion seeking leave to serve by publication, in the order
authorizing publication or in the published summons, nor to
undertake efforts to mail the published summons to Snyderville.
5.

The comparable rule now appears at Utah R. Civ. P. 4(g).
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The party desiring service of process
by publication shall file a motion
verified by the oath of such party or
someone in his behalf for an order of
publication. It shall state the facts
authorizing such service and shall show
the efforts that have been made to obtain
personal service within this state . . • .
The court shall hear the motion ex parte
and, if satisfied that due diligence has
been used to obtain personal service
within this state, or that efforts to
obtain the same would have been of no
avail, shall order publication of the
summons in a newspaper having general
circulation in the county in which the
action is pending.
Rule 4 requires the exercise of "due diligence" to locate
the defendant before the court may authorize service by
publication. "Due diligence must be tailored to fit the
circumstances of each case. It is that diligence which is
appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is
reasonably calculated to do so." Parker v. Ross, 117 Utah 417,
217 P.2d 373, 379 (1950). See also Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d
1269, 1277 n.13 (Utah 1987).
Counsel for Weber was faced with the task of sorting
through numerous disorganized files containing Robert Major's
personal and business affairs. Many documents were held by
family members and former counsel. At the time of trial,
counsel could not recall whether he had seen any documents
specifically linking Snyderville and Gaddis or any contracts or
deeds concerning the conveyance to Snyderville among the
records he examined.
Snyderville first came to plaintiffs counsel's attention
in a June 1982 title report showing Snyderville1s interest.
In an effort to locate information he considered
necessary to serve Snyderville, counsel searched in telephone
directories, motor vehicle files, corporate filings in Utah and
California, the County Recorder's files in Summit and Salt Lake
counties, and in postal records. It is apparent, however, that
Snyderville's address was set forth in the Summit county tax
records pertaining to the very property in issue. Counsel's
quest was apparently for the name of a particular individual
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tied to Snyderville through whom service upon Snyderville could
be perfected. Oddly, however, no inquiry was made by counsel
at the address disclosed as Snyderville*s address in the tax
records, of which counsel had knowledge no later than October
1983, nor was any service of process attempted on Snyderville
at this address." Had either been done, Weber would readily
have been able to personally serve Snyderville through Gaddis,
whose office was the very address stated in the tax records.
A plaintiff seeking authorization for service by
publication on a defendant for whom an in-state address is
known must, at a minimum, make inquiry at that address. Cf.
Downev State Bank v. Maior-Blakeney Corp,. 545 P.2d 507, 509
(Utah 1976) (plaintiff need not exhaust all possibilities where
there is an effort to serve defendant at the only address
reasonably known). This requirement is not only a prerequisite
for satisfying the due diligence prong of Rule 4, but will also
go a long way in establishing a proper factual record upon
which the court may base its order for service by publication.
Service by publication is inappropriate where no personal
inquiry is made at a last known address within the state.7

6« Apparently counsel thought that unless he could advise the
constable of the name and title of a particular person through
whom Snyderville could be served, he could not appropriately
seek service of Snyderville at the address of which he was
aware. A personal visit to the address would presumably have
elicited such information. But such information is not
necessarily required. Had counsel simply advised the constable
to serve Snyderville at its known address, by and through any
-managing or general agent, or other agent authorized to
receive service of process . . . .,- Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5),
one of two things would have happened, either of which would
have served counsel's purposes. The return would have come
back indicating service was effected on Snyderville by and
through its managing partner, Jim Gaddis, in which event
personal service would be complete, or the return would have
come back with an "unable to serve" notation, with explanation
of the constable's failure to locate at the address any person
having knowledge of Snyderville despite diligent inquiry, in
which event the entitlement to serve by publication would be
ironclad given the extensive other efforts exerted by counsel.
7. We note that any defendant served by publication has
standing to challenge the sufficiency of service of process,
Carlson, 740 P.2d at 1271, even where authorized by an order
which, as here, is not directly attacked.
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Since service by publication on Snyderville was not warranted,
such service was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over
Snyderville. Sfifi Hustace v. Kapuni, 6 Haw. App. 241, 718 P.2d
1109, 1116 (1986) (where service by publication is
insufficient, subsequent default judgment is void ab initio).
DISMISSAL
The thrust of Weber's challenge of the ultimate dismissal
of the complaint as against Snyderville is that the court
failed to "issue a brief written statement of the ground for
its decision," as is required on all motions granted under
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56 and 59 when the motion is based
on more than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Weber points
out that Snyderville advanced arguments for dismissal under
both Rule 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) and therefore Rule 52(a) is
applicable. We agree, noting however that Weber did not raise
this issue below.

m Alford v, Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d
201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we held that failure to protest
the trial court's apparent noncompliance with Rule 52 at the
trial level precludes consideration of the omission on
appeal.8 Weber should have raised the issue with the trial
8. Without minimizing the importance of the written statement
required by Rule 52(a), which acquaints both the parties and
any reviewing court of the trial court's rationale, we note
that even if the plaintiff had raised the issue of a written
statement of grounds before the trial court and the court had
not filed its written statement as required by Rule 52(a), we
would likely conclude that the omission was harmless error.
££. Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
(1990) (where trial court did not identify reason for
dismissal, Supreme Court assumed dismissal was premised on one
or both of the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss and
affirmed after considering only one of those grounds, and
determining it was well-taken); Tavlor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770
P.2d 163, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (where trial court did not
state basis for judgment, appellate court considered grounds
advanced in motion for summary judgment and affirmed upon
concluding judgment was properly premised on one of such
grounds); Dover Elev. Co. v. Hill Manaum Investment, 766 P.2d
424, 426 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (where trial court did not
state basis for judgment on stipulated facts, appellate court
noted similarity to cross-motions for summary judgment and
merely noted that "a 'brief written statement of the ground'
for the court's disposition would have been appropriate").
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court, thereby giving the court the opportunity to cure the
problem.
We may. affirm the trial court on any proper ground.
Ruehner Block Co. v. UWC Assons.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah
1988). Thus, if dismissal in this case can be sustained either
on Rule 12(b)(5) or 12(b)(6) grounds, we will affirm. ££.
Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co., 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990)
(where trial court did not identify reason for dismissal,
Supreme Court assumed dismissal was premised on one or both of
the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss and affirmed after
considering only one of those grounds, and determining it was
well-taken).
Weber has limited her argument on dismissal insofar as
premised on Rule 12(b)(5) to an incorporation by reference of
her arguments that Snyderville was sufficiently served either
through personal service on Gaddis or by publication. We have
treated these arguments above and found both to be without
merit. Given the limited scope of Weber's 12(b)(5) argument,
it follows that the order of dismissal should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Because Snyderville West was not properly served either
personally or by publication, the default judgment entered
against it was properly set aside. Because Weber has raised no
argument demonstrating error in dismissal on Rule 12(b)(5)
grounds, the order of dismissal will not be disturbed.
Affirmed.
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OPINION
ORME, Judge:
This is an appeal by plaintiff Brenda Major
Weber1 challenging interlocutory and final
orders setting aside a default judgment in
favor of plaintiff and dismissing defendant
Snyderville West ("Snyderville") as a party to
an action to quiet title to real property. This
appeal primarily focuses on the sufficiency of
service of process on Snyderville.

address on the Summit County tax records.
No filing in the appropriate county or state
offices revealed the name of any individual
affiliated with Snyderville nor did Snyderville
have a telephone directory listing. Although
Gaddis was served in his individual capacity at
his office on May II, 1983, the summons
served upon him was directed to him individually and made no reference to Snyderville
except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy
defendants. The return of service indicated
that Gaddis had been served personally and
did not purport that service on Snyderville had
been effected through him. By order dated
December 17, 1983, the trial court allowed
service by publication upon Snyderville and
sixteen other named defendants.
As a corollary to service by publication,
counsel for Weber prepared a summons for
mailing to Snyderville at its tax address, i.e.,
Gaddis's office at 1253 East 2100 South in
Salt Lake City.
The affidavit of mailing listed Snyderville's
address as "1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly
stating the south coordinate by fifty blocks.
Although there is no such address, and, according to a Postal Service supervisor's affidavit, the summons directed to Snyderville
should have been returned by the Postal
Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that
the summons had been returned, although
other summonses were returned for insufficient postage. The Postal Service does not keep
records of returned first class mail and it is
therefore unknown if the mailed summons
ever reached Snyderville. Gaddis had no recollection of receiving a summons through the
mail.
The trial court entered a default judgment
against Snyderville on August 29, 1985. In the
fall of 1988, Snyderville sought to have the
judgment set aside. The district court determined that there was "no adequate explanation ... (for the] failure to personally serve
Snyderville West at its known tax address"
and set aside the judgment. In 1989, Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss premised on
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which
was granted. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Weber claims that Snyderville
was effectively served through personal service
upon Jim Gaddis or, alternatively, that it was
properly served by publication. Weber also
challenges the court's order of dismissal in
favor of Snyderville as improper under Utah
R. Civ. P. 52(a).*

FACTS
On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major filed a
complaint to quiet title to eleven parcels of
real estate located in Summit County. Snyderville, a Utah general partnership, and Jim
Gaddis were two of seventy named defendants. 2 Jim Gaddis holds a ten-percent interest
in Snyderville and is its managing partner.
In 1978, Snyderville purchased from Investor Associates a portion of the property at
issue in the quiet title action. Robert W.
Major executed the pertinent real estate contract on behalf of Investor Associates. Snyderville took possession of the property and
made timely payments, with the final payment
being made on July 20, 1983. In October
1983, Snyderville recorded a warranty deed for
the property given to it by Investor Associates.
PERSONAL SERVICE
Snyderville paid property taxes on the parcel
Weber asserts that Gaddis's position as
through October 1987, when it learned that
managing partner of Snyderville qualified him
the trial court had divested it of title by means
Digitized
J. Reuben
Clark of
Lawprocess
School, BYU.
to receive
service
for Snyderville.
of a default judgment against
it. by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain
errors.
Weber
further
claims
that
service
upon Gaddis
From the time it took possession of the

vv c clglC

that Gaddis was authorized to receive proce;
for Snyderville. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)0
(service upon a partnership shall be effectiv
through service upon managing or genen
agent). However, personal service upo
Gaddis did not confer jurisdiction over Snj
derville. Weber incorrectly focuses o
Gaddis's capacity, rather than the import c
the summons served upon him. Any numbc
of agents or partners of Snyderville might b
authorized to receive service for the partnei
ship, yet if no service is ever attempted on th
partnership no service on it can be perfected. 4
Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce
dure states, with our emphasis: "The summon
shall contain the ... names ... of the parties U
the action ... (and] be directed to the defen
dant." Gaddis's summons was directed t<
him, not to Snyderville. While this might hav
provided Snyderville with constructive or eve
actual knowledge of the action, the insuffici
ency of process is not thereby cured. See Ston
v. Hicks. 45 N.C. App. 66, 262 S.E.2d 318
319 (1980) (where one defendant received
summons directed to another defendant
service was ineffective on the receiving defe
ndant even though the caption listed him as
defendant). See generally 62B Am. Jur. 2d Pre
cess section 81 (1990). We hold that servic
of process upon Jim Gaddis in his individus
capacity did not effect service of proces
upon, nor confer jurisdiction over, Snyderv
ille.
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
Rule 4 ( 0 ( 0 of the Utah Rules of Civ
Procedure, in effect at all times pertinent t<
this case, 9 authorized service by publicatioi
when personal service is impractical becaus
the
person upon whom service is sought
resides outside of the state, or has
departed from the state, or cannot
after due diligence be found within
the state....
The party desiring service of
process by publication shall file a
motion verified by the oath of such
party or someone in his behalf for
an order of publication. It shall
state the facts authorizing such
service and shall show the efforts
that have been made to obtain
personal service within this state ....
The court shall hear the motion ex
parte and, if satisfied that due diligence has been used to obtain
personal service within this state, or
that efforts to obtain the same
would have been of no avail, shall
order publication of the summons
in a newspaper having general cir-

to locate the defendant before the court I
luthorize service by publication. "Due
ice must be tailored to fit the circumstof each case. It is that diligence which is j
priate to accomplish the end sought and
is reasonably calculated to do so." Parker
its,
117 Utah 417, 217 P.2d 373,
950). See also Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d
1277 n.13 (Utah 1987).
insel for Weber was faced with the task
ting through numerous disorganized files
ning Robert Major's personal and busaffairs. Many documents were held by
' members and former counsel. At the
>f trial, counsel could not recall whether
j seen any documents specifically linking
rville and Gaddis or any contracts or
concerning the conveyance to Snydervlong the records he examined,
fdcrville first c a m e t o p l a i n t i f f ' s
el's attention in a June 1982 title report
ng Snyderville's interest,
an effort to locate information he consI necessary to serve Snyderville, counsel
[ied in telephone directories, motor
e files, corporate filings in Utah and
>rnia, the County Recorder's files in
[lit and Salt Lake counties, and in postal
is. It is apparent, however, that Snydes address was set forth in the Summit
y tax records pertaining to the very
:rty in issue. Counsel's quest was appa' for the name of a particular individual
o Snyderville through whom service upon
erville could be perfected. O d d l y ,
ver, no inquiry was made by counsel at
ddress disclosed as Snyderville's address
te tax records, of which counsel had
ledge no later than October 1983, nor
my service of process attempted on Snylle at this address. 6 Had either been done,
T would readily have been able to persy serve Snyderville through Gaddis,
e office was the very address stated in the
:cords.
plaintiff seeking authorization for service
iblication on a defendant for whom an inaddress is known must, at a minimum,
: inquiry at that address. Cf.
Downey
Bank v. Major-Blakeney
Corp., 545
507, 509 (Utah 1976) (plaintiff need not
jst all possibilities where there is an effort
rve defendant at the only address reasot known). This requirement is not only a
quisite for satisfying the due diligence
g of Rule 4, but will also go a long way
tablishing a proper factual record upon
h the court may base its order for service
ublication. Service by publication is inapriate where no personal inquiry is made
last known address within the state. 7 Since

Hustace v. Kapum, o Maw. App. z « i , / i o
P.2d 1109, 1116 (1986) (where service by
publication is insufficient, subsequent default
judgment is void ab initio).

1. This action was originally brought by Steven W.
Major, personal representative of the estate of
Robert W. Major, Jr. During the course of the litigation Steven W. Major died and the present plaiDISMISSAL
ntiff was named as successor personal representative.
The thrust of Weber's challenge of the
2. As may be expected in litigation involving numultimate dismissal of the complaint as against
erous parties and several transactions, the facts
Snyderville is that the court failed to "issue a
before the court are numerous and complicated. We
brief written statement of the ground for its
commend counsel for both parties for their succinct
decision," as is required on all motions
presentation of the relevant facts. We further note
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56
that both parties* careful compliance with Utah R.
and 59 when the motion is based on more
App. P. 24 has assisted the court in efficiently decthan one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
iding the matters before it. Of particular assistance
Weber points out that Snyderville advanced
to the court was the comprehensive addenda of key
documents annexed to the briefs.
arguments for dismissal under both Rule
3. Weber also claims that, notwithstanding any
12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) and therefore Rule 52(a)
deficiencies in service of process, Snyderville is
is applicable. We agree, noting however that
bound by a stipulation for settlement and the judgWeber did not raise this issue below.
ment entered thereon on January 17, 1986, by
In Alford v. Utah League of Cities and
reason of the fact Gaddis, through his own counsel,
Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct. App.
was a party to the stipulation. We find no merit in
1990), we held that failure to protest the trial
this argument nor in Weber's lis pendens argument,
court's apparent noncompliance with Rule 52
raised for the first time in her reply brief.
at the trial level precludes consideration of the
4. Weber's claim that service on Gaddis was adeqomission on appeal. 1 Weber should have
uate to serve the partnership is belied by Weber's
own course of conduct. If she believed Snyderville
raised the issue with the trial court, thereby
had been properly served through Gaddis there
giving the court the opportunity to cure the
would have been no need to include it in the motion
problem.
seeking leave to serve by publication, in the order
We may affirm the trial court on any proper
authorizing publication or in the published
ground. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.,
summons, nor to undertake efforts to mail the
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). Thus, if dispublished summons to Snyderville.
missal in this case can be sustained either on
5. The comparable rule now appears at Utah R.
Rule 12(b)(5) or 12(b)(6) grounds, we will
Civ. P. 4(g).
6. Apparently counsel thought that unless he could
affirm. Cf. Burnett v. Utah Power & Light
advise the constable of the name and title of a parCo., 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990) (where trial
ticular person through whom Snyderville could be
court did not identify reason for dismissal,
served, he could not appropriately seek service of
Supreme Court assumed dismissal was premSnyderville at the address of which he was aware. A
ised on one or both of the grounds advanced
personal visit to the address would presumably have
in motion to dismiss and affirmed after conelicited such information. But such information is
sidering only one of those grounds, and detenot necessarily required. Had counsel simply advised
rmining it was well-taken).
the constable to serve Snyderville at its known
Weber has limited her argument on dismiaddress, by and through any "managing or general
agent, or other agent authorized to receive service of
ssal insofar as premised on Rule 12(b)(5) to an
process
* Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5), one of two
incorporation by reference of her arguments
things would have happened, either of which would
that Snyderville was sufficiently served either
have served counsel's purposes. The return would
through personal service on Gaddis or by
have come back indicating service was effected on
publication. We have treated these arguments
Snyderville by and through its managing partner,
above and found both to be without merit.
Jim Gaddis, in which event personal service would
Given the limited scope of Weber's 12(b)(5)
be complete, or the return would have come back
argument, it follows that the order of dismiwith an "unable to serve" notation, with explanation
ssal should be affirmed.
of the constable's failure to locate at the address
any person having knowledge of Snyderville despite
CONCLUSION
diligent inquiry, in which event the entitlement to
Because Snyderville West was not properly
serve by publication would be ironclad given the
served either personally or by publication, the
extensive other efforts exerted by counsel.
7. We note that any defendant served by publication
default judgment entered against it was prohas standing to challenge the sufficiency of service
perly set aside. Because Weber has raised no
of process, Carlson, 740 P.2d at 1271, even where
argument demonstrating error in dismissal on
authorized by an order which, as here, is not direRule 12(b)(5) grounds, the order of dismissal
ctly attacked.
will not be disturbed. Affirmed.
8. Without minimizing the importance of the written
J. Reuben
Clark Law
School,
BYU.
Gregory K. Orme, Digitized
Judge by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
statement
required
by Rule
52(a),
which acquaints
Machine-generated OCR, may
errors.
both contain
the parties
and any reviewing court of the trial

we would likely conclude that the omission i
harmless error. Cf. Burnett v. Utah Power & L\
Co.. 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990) (where trial cc
did not identify reason for dismissal. Supreme Cc
assumed dismissal was premised on one or both
the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss i
affirmed after considering only one of th
grounds, and determining it was well-taken); Taylo
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168 (U
Ct. App. 1989) (where trial court did not state b
for judgment, appellate court considered grou
advanced in motion for summary judgment ;
affirmed upon concluding judgment was prop
premised on one of such grounds); Dover Elev.
v. Hill Mangum Investment, 766 P.2d 424, 426
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (where trial court did not si
basis for judgment on stipulated facts, appel
court noted similarity to cross-motions
summary judgment and merely noted that "a *b
written statement of the ground' for the cou
disposition would have been appropriate").
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OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Randall D. Tucker appeals his convicl
for theft, a third degree felony, in violatior
Utah Code Ann. §76-6 404 (1990).
affirm.
On March 29, 1989, Mr. Hansen drove
his property near Redwood Road wher
locked storage shed containing his son's |
sessions was located. Mr. Hansen found <
A

